

#### **MODEL AGENTS: SOCIAL BEHAVIOR THROUGH THE FORMAL LENS**

## THE WISDOMOF CROWDS



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### Sometimes groups can be smart.



FRANCIS GALTON If I may be allowed!

I can personally attest to the surprising accuracy of group judgment.

I mean, of course...



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the ox! 辆

### **COUNTRY MATTERS**

A weight-judging competition was carried on at the annual show of the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition, in Plymouth, in 1907.

Competitors would try to guess the weight of an ox that had been slaughtered and laid out in the market.

Guesses would be submitted on paper tickets.

Closest guesses would receive prizes.

James Holland. Country Fair.



About 800 tickets were issued, which were kindly lent me for examination after they had fulfilled their immediate purpose... [of which] there remained 787 for discussion.

Galton, F. (1907). Vox populi. Nature, 75(7), 450-451.

#### [MARCH 7, 1907

7º-o at Moyeni, Basutoland, on August 23. The arly value of the absolute maxima was 86°-o, and of th ading minima 41°-6. The mean terup was 0°-9 below the average. The store ober, and the calmest was April. ave also received the official meteorol eroture fo

ks for South Australia (1904) and Mysore (1905). Both se works contain valuable me

silla Valley for most of the years between 1851 riod was 61º-6, mean mean minimum 41º.4. absolu several times) absolut The mean annual rain August, and the mean annual an per cent. The bulletin was prepared by 

Meteorological Observations in Germany.—The results the observations made under the system of the Deutsche cewarte, Hamburg, for 1905, at ten stations of the second der, and at fifty-six storm-warning stations, have been revived. This is the twenty-eighth yearly volume ublished by the Seewarte, and forms part of the series of erman meteorological year-books. We have frequently 1 ed to this excellent series, and the volume in questing to th salitic coasts. We note that the sunshine at Hamburg was only 29 per cent. of the possible annual amount, and that were 103 sunless days; the rainfall was 25-9 inches, he rainy days being 172 in number.

#### VOX POPULI.

these democratic days, any investigation into the rustworthiness and peculiarities of popular judgments interest. The material about to be discussed refers small matter, but is much to the point.

ght-judging competition was carried on at the show of the West of England Fat Stock and Exhibition recently held at Plymouth. A fat ox cen selected, competitors bought stamped and cards, for 6d. each, on which to inscribe their ards, lor 6d. each, on which to inscribe their names, addresses, and estimates of what the weigh after it had been slaughtered and Those who guessed most successfully received at 800 tickets were issued, which were kindly re cxamination after they had fulfilled their purpose. These afforded excellent material. on and uninfluenced principly and the like. The sixpenny fee deterred praction prompted each competitor to do his best. The petitors included butchers and farmers, some of whon bight except in judging the weight of cattle; others is probably guided by such information as they might or article; others in the petitors included butchers and farmers, some of whon bight except in judging the weight of cattle; others is probably guided by such information as they might or article; others is of judging the merits of most political issues on the two tes, and the variety among the voters to judging the merits of most political issues on the votes, and the variety among the voters to judging the merits of most political issues on the votes, and the variety among the voters to judging the merits of most political issues on the votes abably much the same in either case. and the like. The rred pracwas probably much the same in either case. r weeding thirteen cards out of the collection, as limits. In other words, the

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NO. 1949, VOL. 75]

Degrees of the length of Array o"-100"	Estimates in Ibs.	Cent	1	
		Observed deviates from 1207 lbs.	Normal p.e =37	Excess of Observed over Normal
5	1074	- 133	- 90	+43
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15	1126	- 81	- 57	+ 24
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30	1174	- 33	- 29	. + 4
35	1151	- 26	- 21	: + 5
40	1188	- 19	~ 14	+ 5
45	1197	- 10	- 7	: + 3
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55	1214	+ 7 ;	+ 7	: 0
60	1219	+ 12 1	+ 14	; - 2
65	1225	+ 18	$\div 2I$	- 3
70	1230	+ 23	+ 29	- 6
9275	1236	+ 29	+ 37	- 8
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90	1267	+ 52	+70	- 18
95	1293	+ 86	+90	1 - 4

 $q_{\rm B}, q_{\rm B}$  the first and third quartiles, stand at  $a_3^{\circ}$  and  $\gamma_3^{\circ}$  m, the median or middlemost value, stands at  $g_0^{\circ}$ . The dressed weight proved to be 1395 lbs.

According to the democratic principle of alue," the middlemost estimate expr ses the vox populi, was in this whole the distance from it 3.5 Diagram, from the tabular values.



niddle deviated of a single or 37 lb. observation may be reck table, and graphically in the diagra



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People have since pointed out that the mean was even more accurate: 1197 lbs.



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People have since pointed out that the mean was even more accurate: 1197 lbs.

This result is, I think, more creditable to the trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than might have been expected.

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# The mechanism at play here is captured in a simple model.

To get a feeling for it, let's play a game.

Guess the correct version of the logo.

Guess the correct version of the logo.



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## How did you do? And how did the group do?

# Here's the model we're working with.

### **AGENTS AS NOISY ESTIMATORS OF THE TRUTH**

A number of *agents* vote on two alternatives, one of which is correct.

Each agent has a specific competence, i.e., the probability of voting for the correct alternative.



It's possible that everyone ends up voting for the wrong thing, e.g., if they get the wrong signal.

But how likely is this?...
## NOTATION

voters  $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ -i's guess of the right answer a $v_i \in A$ voter *i*'s competence  $/ \Pr[v_i = a] = p_i$ , with  $p_i \in [0, 1]$  $F_{maj}(v) = x$ , such that  $v_i = x$  for a (strict) majority of voters

alternatives  $A = \{a, b\}$ correct alternative voter *i*'s vote profile of votes  $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ majority vote

we write profiles as words:  $(a, a, b, a, ...) \rightarrow aaba...$ 

we assume *n* is odd so as not to worry about ties

probability that i gets the right answer



THE MARQUIS DE CONDORCET I want to make some assumptions.

#### **ASSUMPTIONS**

(Competence) Agents are better than random at being correct:

$$p_i > \frac{1}{2}$$
, for any voter  $i \in N$ 

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(Independence) Voters vote independently of each other:

$$\Pr[v_i = x, v_j = y] = \Pr[v_i = x] \cdot \Pr[v_j = y], \text{ for}$$

- Ī.
- $\in N$ .
- or all voters  $i, j \in N$ .



THE MARQUIS DE CONDORCET I claim that under these conditions, the majority tends to get it right!

#### We want to understand the probability that the majority opinion is correct:

$$\Pr[F_{maj}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)=a]$$

# Computing the accuracy of the group gets more and more involved as the number of agents grows.

# But let's start simple.

## **ONE VOTER**

The profile is  $v = (v_1)$ .

The probability of a correct decision is:

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<sup>in this case, trivially</sup>

#### **TWO VOTERS**

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Oh wait, we're not looking at this case.

The profile is  $\boldsymbol{v} = (v_1, v_2, v_3)$ .

The probability of a correct majority decision is:

 $\Pr[F_{maj}(v) = a] = \Pr[a \text{ majority of voters in } v \text{ are correct}]$ 

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$$\begin{aligned} \Pr\left[F_{maj}(\boldsymbol{v})=a\right]&=\Pr\left[\text{a majority of voters in }\boldsymbol{v} \text{ are correct}\right]\\ &=\Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v} \text{ is either } aab, aba, baa, \text{ or } aaa\right]\\ &=\Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v}=aab\right]+\Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v}=aba\right]+\Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v}=baa\right]+\Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v}=aaa\right]\end{aligned}$$

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Note that as p grows, so does group accuracy.

And a group of size 3 is more likely to be correct than a group of size 1.



#### **FIVE VOTERS**

The profile is  $v = (v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4, v_5)$ .

The probability of a correct majority decision is:

$$\begin{split} \Pr\left[F_{maj}(\boldsymbol{v})=a\right] &= \Pr\left[\text{a majority of voters in } \boldsymbol{v} \text{ are correct}\right] \\ &= \Pr\left[\text{either exactly } 3, 4 \text{ or } 5 \text{ voters in } \boldsymbol{v} \text{ are correct}\right] \\ &= \Pr\left[\boldsymbol{v} \text{ is either } aaabb, aabab, aabaab, abaab, aabba, ababa, baabaa, aabaa, aabaa, aabaaa, baaaaa, or aaaaaa\right] \\ &\cdots \\ &= 10 \cdot p^3 (1-p)^2 + 5 \cdot p^4 (1-p) + p^5 \end{split}$$

$$= {\binom{5}{3}} \cdot p^3 (1-p)^2 + {\binom{5}{4}} \cdot p^4 (1-p)^1 + {\binom{5}{5}} \cdot p^5$$

Note, again, that as p grows, so does group accuracy.

And a group of size 5 is more likely to be correct than a group of size 3.



### ANY ODD NUMBER OF VOTERS

The profile is  $\boldsymbol{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ .

The probability of a correct majority decision is:

 $\Pr[F_{maj}(v) = a] = \Pr[a \text{ majority of voters in } v \text{ are correct}]$  $= \Pr \left[ \text{either exactly } | n/2 | + 1, \dots, n-1, \text{ or } n \text{ voters in } v \text{ are correct} \right]$  $= \binom{n}{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor + 1} \cdot p^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor + 1} (1-p)^{n - (\lfloor n/2 \rfloor + 1)} + \binom{n}{n-1} p^{n-1} (1-p)^1 + \binom{n}{n} p^n$  $=\sum_{i=\lfloor n/2\rfloor+1}^{n} \binom{n}{i} p^{i} (1-p)^{n-i}.$ 



THE MARQUIS DE CONDORCET By the croissants of my ancestors, I claim that groups improve with size!

## THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM (CJT)

#### THEOREM

For n voters, with n odd, all of whom have accuracy p > 1/2 and vote independently of each other, it holds that:

(1) The accuracy of the group improves as the size of the group grows:

$$\Pr\left[F_{maj}(v_1,\ldots,v_{n+2})=a\right] > \Pr\left[F_{maj}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)=a\right].$$

(2) The accuracy of the group is at least as good as the accuracy of the inidividual members:

$$\Pr[F_{maj}(v_1,\ldots,v_n)=a]$$

(3) As n goes to infinity, the accuracy of the group approaches 1 asymptotically:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr \left[ F_{maj}(v_1, \dots, v_n) = \right]$$

- $\geq p.$
- a = 1.

# How to prove this?

#### PROOF OF CLAIM 1: LARGER GROUPS HAVE BETTER ACCURACY

This is shown by analyzing the expression for the accuracy of a group of *n* voters.

And deriving a recurrence relation for it, in terms of the accuracy of a group of n - 2 voters.



#### PROOF OF CLAIM 2: THE GROUP IS BETTER THAN ITS MEMBERS

This follows from Claim 1, as single voters are just groups of size 1.

#### PROOF OF CLAIM 3: IN THE LIMIT, ACCURACY IS PERFECT

Use the Law of Large Numbers.

## THE (WEAK) LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS

#### **THEOREM**

If  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$  are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables such that  $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = \mu$ , then, for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , it holds that:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr\left[ \left| \frac{X_1 + \dots + X_n}{n} - \mu \right| < \varepsilon \right] = 1.$$



#### THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS: INTUITION

Consider random variables that take value 1 with probability 0.02, and 0 with probability 0.98:

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1, \text{ with probability } 0.02, \\ 0, \text{ with probability } 0.98, \end{cases}$$

The expected value of such a variable is:

 $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = 1 \cdot 0.02 + 0 \cdot 0.98 = 0.02.$ 



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$$\mathbb{E}[X_i] = 1 \cdot 0.02 + 0 \cdot 0.98 = 0.02.$$

If we sample a large number of such variables (e.g., a million), we'd expect about 2% of them to take value 1.

Or the average to be very close to 0.02.



In our setting, random variables keep track of whether agents are correct or not.

#### PROOF OF CLAIM 3: IN THE LIMIT, ACCURACY IS PERFECT

Random variables keep track of whether agents are correct:

 $X_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if voter } i \text{ is correct, i.e., if } v_i = a, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$ 

We want to show that, in the long run, more than half of these take value 1:

$$X_1{+}{\dots}{+}X_n>rac{n}{2}$$

Or, equivalently:

$$rac{X_1+\ldots+X_n}{n}>rac{1}{2}$$

The bias in favor of the truth ensures that, on average, and in the long run, more people vote for it than not.





FRANCIS GALTON This probably also explains what happened at the country fair!



# Let's sum up.



THE MARQUIS DE CONDORCET Groups are better than their members.

The larger the group, the better.

In the limit, performance is perfect.

As long as people are better than random, and vote independently!



# But people are not generally independent...

Can social structure interfere with group accuracy?

ODORIC OF PORDENONE In a province of the Grand Can there grow gourds, which, when they are ripe, open, and within them is found a little beast like unto a young lamb...

Odoric of Pordenone [trans. Sir Henry Yule] (2002). The Travels of Friar Odoric. W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.



AD 1330

SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE

In Tartary groweth a manner of fruit, as though it were gourds. And when they be ripe, men cut them a-two, and men find within a little beast, in flesh, in bone, and blood, as though it were a little lamb without wool. And men eat both the fruit and the beast. And that is a great marvel.

Of that fruit I have eaten... and found it wondirfulle.

Mandeville, J. (1900). The Travels of Sir John Mandeville. The Cotton Manuscript in modern spelling. Macmillan and Co. Limited.



AD 1357 - 1371

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AD 1357 - 1371

AD 1515 - 1553

BARON SIGISMUND VON HERBERSTEIN [...] a certain seed like that of a melon, but rather rounder and longer, from which, when it was set in the earth, grew a plant resembling a lamb, and attaining to a height of about two and a half feet...

Sigmund Freiherr von Herberstein (1851). Notes Upon Russia: Being a Translation of the Earliest Account of that Country, Entitled Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii. Hakluyt Society.



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ATHANASIUS KIRCHER [...] we assert that it is a plant. Though its form be that of a quadruped, and the juice beneath its woolly covering be blood which flows if an incision be made in its flesh, these things will not move us. It will be found to be a plant.

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CLAUDE DURET Duret, C. (1605). Histoire Admirable des Plantes.



AD 1330

Kircher, A. (1641). Magnes; sive de arte magneticâ opus tripartitum.

AD 1641



Of that fruit I have eaten... and found it wondirfulle.

Mandeville, J. (1900). The Travels of Sir John Mandeville. The Cotton Manuscript in modern spelling. Macmillan and Co. Limited.

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Odoric of Pordenone [trans. Sir Henry Yule] (2002). The Travels of Friar Odoric. W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

ENGELBERT KAEMPFER I have searched ad risum et nauseam for this zoophyte feeding on grass, but have found nothing. Kaempfer, E. (1712). Amœnitatum Exoticarum politico-physico-medicarum fascicul.

AD 1683

AD 1641

ATHANASIUS KIRCHER [...] we assert that it is a plant. Though its form be that of a quadruped, and the juice beneath its woolly covering be blood which flows if an incision be made in its flesh, these things will not move us. It will be found to be a plant.

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# Let's model this.

MORRIS DEGROOT



Agents are represented by nodes in a social network, and update their opinions depending on the opinions of their peers.

## THE DEGROOT MODEL

belief of agent i at tsocial network

agent *i*'s neighborhood weight on edge from i to j

update rule

agents  $1, 2, \ldots, n$ time  $t \in \{0, 1, 2, ...\}$ 

number between 0 and 1

directed graph with agents as vertices, and who-pays-attention-to-who as edges

agents that i pays attention to

number that indicates how much weight i places on j's opinion; we assume i distributes a total weight of 1 across i's neighborhood

at time t + 1 every agent updates their belief to a weighted average over the beliefs of neighbors

# **Agents** 1, 2, 3







1, 2, 3

### Time

 $t=0,\,1,\,2,\,...$ 

100

80

60

40

20



 $1,\,2,\,3$ 

#### Time

 $t = 0, \, 1, \, 2, \, ...$ 

#### Beliefs

Agent 1 starts out at 1, agents 2 and 3 start out at 0.



1, 2, 3

#### Time

t = 0, 1, 2, ...

#### Beliefs

Agent 1 starts out at 1, agents 2 and 3 start out at 0.

#### Social network

Agent 1 pays attention to everyone, 2 and 3 pay attention only to 1.

#### Neighborhoods

Agent 1's neighborhood is {1, 2, 3}, etc.



1, 2, 3

#### Time

t = 0, 1, 2, ...

#### Beliefs

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#### Social network

Agent 1 pays attention to everyone, 2 and 3 pay attention only to 1.

#### Neighborhoods

Agent 1's neighborhood is {1, 2, 3}, etc.

#### Weights

0.4Agent 1 puts 0.5 weight on themselves and 0.25 on 2 and 3 each, and so on. 0.2



 $1,\,2,\,3$ 

#### Time

 $t = 0, \, 1, \, 2, \, \dots$ 

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#### **Belief updates**

At time 1 agent 1's belief becomes:





 $1,\,2,\,3$ 

#### Time

 $t = 0, \, 1, \, 2, \, \dots$ 

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 $1,\,2,\,3$ 

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#### **Belief updates**

At time 1 agent 1's belief becomes:





Do the beliefs of each agent converge, i.e., reach a point after which they do not change anymore?

If yes, then is there consensus, i.e., do beliefs converge to the same value?



morris degroot Yes!

Under certain conditions...

# Certain types of cycles are 1.0 bad news.





0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

#### DEFINITION

A network is *aperiodic* if the greatest common divisor of any two cycle lengths is 1.



MORRIS DEGROOT Cycles of length 2, 3 and 4 are fine.

Also cycles of length 1, i.e., self-loops.

But cycles of length 2 and 4, or 3 and 6... no bueno.

## Isolated nodes are also bad 1.0 news. 0.8





0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

#### DEFINITION

A network is *strongly connected* if there is a path from any node to any other node.



MORRIS DEGROOT Strong connectedness and aperiodicity do the trick!

### THEOREM (DEGROOT, 1974)

### If the social network is strongly connected and aperiodic, then, for any initial beliefs, agents converge in the limit to the same belief.

DeGroot, M. H. (1974). Reaching a Consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69(345), 118–121.

# Nice!

# But what needs to happen for agents in the DeGroot model to arrive at a consensus that is also *correct*?

## THE DEGROOT MODEL WITH TRUTH

belief of agent i at t

social network

agent *i*'s neighborhood weight on edge from i to j

update rule

agents  $1, 2, \ldots, n$ time  $t \in \{0, 1, 2, ...\}$ true state  $\mu \in (0,1)$  **NEW** 

> number between 0 and 1 drawn from a distribution with mean  $\mu$ and finite variance above a threshold  $\delta > 0$

and who-pays-attention-to-who as edges

agents that i pays attention to

number that indicates how much weight i places on j's opinion; we assume *i* distributes a total weight of 1 across *i*'s neighborhood

at time t + 1 every agent updates their belief to a weighted average over the beliefs of neighbors

- NEW
- aperiodic, strongly connected directed graph with agents as vertices,

# BENJAMIN GOLUB We want to speak now of wise *networks*.



#### MATTHEW O. JACKSON As with the Condorcet Jury Theorem, this is a limit condition as the network grows larger and larger.

Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.





#### **DEFINITION** We write $G_n$ for a network with n vertices.

A sequence  $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_n, \ldots$  of (strongly connected and aperiodic) networks of increasing size is wise if the consensus belief approaches the true state  $\mu$  asymptotically, as n goes to infinity.

#### BENJAMIN GOLUB There's a really cool way of thinking about the consensus belief.

Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.



# There's a really cool way of thinking about the



#### MATTHEW O. JACKSON The consensus belief is a linear combination of the initial beliefs and the *eigenvector centralities* of the nodes.

Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.

**BENJAMIN GOLUB** consensus belief.



# The *centrality* of a node in a network is a measure of how influential that node is.

# **EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY**

A node is influential if it is connected to an influential node.


# **EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY**

A node is influential if it is connected to an influential node.

The centrality of a neighbor is proportional to the sum of neighbors' centralities.



# **EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY**

A node is influential if it is connected to an influential node.

The centrality of a neighbor is proportional to the sum of neighbors' centralities.

Obtained by solving a system of linear equations.



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Obtained by solving a system of linear equations.





LARRY PAGE Eigenvector centrality is behind PageRank.

### That is, the original Google algorithm for ranking

# SERGEY BRIN webpages.



## EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY & CONSENSUS BELIEFS

The eigenvector centralities are c = (2/3, 1/6, 1/6).

Centralities indicate the importance of the nodes for the limit consensus belief:

$$\left(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6}\right) \cdot (1, 0, 0) = \frac{2}{3} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 0$$
<sup>1.0</sup>  
0.8

$$=rac{2}{3}.$$
 0.6

0.2

0.0





### **THEOREM (GOLUB & JACKSON, 2010)**

A sequence  $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_n, \ldots$  of (strongly connected and aperiodic) networks of increasing size is wise if and only if the eigenvector centrality of every agent i approaches 0asymptotically, as n goes to infinity.

> Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.

## For a network to be wise, there can't be a node that, in the long run, retains positive influence.



### MATTHEW O. JACKSON As the network grows and grows, the influence of every node should go to 0.

Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010). Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 112–149.

**BENJAMIN GOLUB** 



## NETWORKS THAT ARE NOT WISE

The network grows by adding agents that listen to the central agent 1.

The eigenvector centralities are:

$$c = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2(n-1)}, \dots, \frac{1}{2(n-1)}\right)$$

Agent 1 retains a constant share of (network) influence as n grows.

	1.0
And thus decides the consensus belief.	0.8
No bueno.	0.6
	0.4
	0.2
	0.0



Influential nodes draw the collective opinion towards their own opinion, rather than the truth.

Maybe what happened with the vegetable lamb...





ELON MUSK Free speech is the bedrock of a functioning democracy.

And X is the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated.

But if some voices in this square have outsized influence, due to their position in the network, how democratic is this really?...